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INTRODUCTION

Just as we now look back on the past 40 years with some bewildermentand embarrassment-that we were so slow to recognise the human rights of
indigenous people, children, people with a disability, older people and
others-it is intriguing to wonder whether our children will look back in 40
years and wonder how we possibly failed for so long to take animal rights
seriously." ,
The sentiment of Professor David Weisbrot above encapsulates the
notion that living beings deserve the right to be free, self-ruling, and
dignified. These values are important in the United States and are not
subject to the voting booth.' Statutes, and even the United States
Constitution, will evolve under the common law when the times requires it
to do so.' Human beings, no matter their legal status, cannot be deprived of
life and liberty notwithstanding past precedents . Although the weight of
IDA VIDWEISBROT, COMMENT, AUSTL. L. REFORM COMMISSION REFORM J. I (2007),
HTIP:llWWW.AUSTLII.EDU.AU/AU/JOURNALS/ALRCREFJU200711.HTML
2 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of State of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 ,736 (1964)
("One's right to life, liberty, and property and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote ; they depend on the outcome of no elections.'').
3 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the denial of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples violated the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding centuries of
historical evidence reflecting the fact that marriage was always understood to be between a man
and a women).

41d.
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history, tradition, and the United States Constitution may provide
guidelines they do not represent boundaries and future generations may
modify these principles in order to account for new understandings .' The
recognition of injustice, whether to a human being, a slave, or non-human
animals, is not a stagnant principle, and as new generations come to pass
the need to rethink old habits will be their duty ..
Less than two centuries ago, the Supreme Court of the United
States held, "the right of property in a [human] slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution." The patently repugnant sense we
now have when reading this infamous opinion is the consequence of moral,
social, and legal changes in our country. These rudimentary, but essential,
principles what principles is he referring to? Unclear have taken a slow
evolutionary path in American law. The evolutionary process has taken
centuries of legal arguments, confrontation and even war.' The recognition
of humanity and dignity for living beings by the Supreme Court of the
United States has paralleled our nation's contemporary ideas at the time.' It
is also true, however, that such recognition has also benefited non-humans,
such as corporations, to better comport with our economic ideology."
.
We now find ourselves at the precipice of a new legal rights class
expansion-animal legal status in its own right. The holders of legal rights
are afforded the ability to (1) utilize the law to address injury done to them,
(2) have the court acknowledge and take account of that injury, and (3) be
the direct beneficiary of legal relief in court ." Rights-holders' interest is
recognized and protected by the law." Being a rights holder does not equate
to "being human.": The scope of this expansion of rights , however, will be
key to its general acceptance as a legitimate legal theory. The expansion

S See id. ("History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries. That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to
rule the present."),
6

Id. at 2598.

7 Dred

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,451 (1856), superseded (1868) .

80 bergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614.
See Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that statutes criminalizing consensual acts
of sodomy in private could no longer endure constitutional protection in light of the modem
times) .
10 Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, From Property to Person : The Case ofEvelyn Hart, II
SETON HALL CONST . L.J . I (2000) .
11 David Hambrick, A legal Argument against Animals as Property, in 55 PEOPLE, PROPERTY, OR
PETS? (Marc D. Hauser, Fiery Cushman & Matthew Kamen eds. 2006).
9

12Id.
I d. at 56.

13
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must be narrow in scope and applicability in order to take account of the
competing human interest at hand.
Philosophers and jurists alike recognize the balance that must be
struck between the interests of humans versus the interest of non-human
animals. They can provide ample social and ethical justification for the
killing of animals for sustenance or for the purposes of protecting oneself
from harm. As early as Eighteenth Century , however, scholars recognized
that there is little to no justification for the unnecessary mistreatment,
suffering, and abuse of animals, stating:
But is there any reason why we should be allowed to torment [non-human
animals]? None that I can see. Are there any reasons why we should not be
allowed to torment them? Yes, several. Calling people 'slaves' and giving
them the legal status that the lower animals are given in England, for
example-there was a time when that was the situation of a majority of the
human species, and I grieve to say in many places that time is still with us .
The day may come when the non-human part of the animal creation will
acquire the rights that never could have been withheld from them except by
the hand of tyranny . . .. Perhaps it will someday be recognized that the
number of legs, the hairiness of the skin, or the possession of a tail are
equally insufficient reasons for abandoning to the same fate a creature that
can feel ... The question is not Can they reason? or Can they talk? but
Can they suffer ?..

The observations of Jeremy Bentham bring us to the special case
involving our closest living relative-the chimpanzee . Chimpanzees share
almost ninety-nine percent of our genetic blueprint." Chimpanzees and
humans share common ancestors who roamed the earth four to eight billion
years ago." The similarities between chimpanzees and human beings , both
physically and cognitively speaking, are striking." The chimpanzee's brain
is stimulated in the same areas and networks as the human brain when
conducting acts related to preparation, foresight, episodic memory, and
memories of first-person events ." Chimpanzees share similar brain
asymmetry which evinces sophisticated communication. " They possess the

Jeremy Bentham, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 162, 144 (1789).
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 11,20159:35 PM),
hllP://animals.nationalgeographic.comlanima1s/mammals/chimpanzee/.
14

15 Chimpanzee,

16 /d.

17 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Habeas COYpus at 6, Nonhuman Rights
Project, Inc. ex reI. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S .3d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (No. 28)
2015 WL 1872095.
18 1d . at 7.
19 1d .
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intellectual aptitude to understand sign language as well as other
communicative gestures and vocalization> A linguistic chimpanzee, named
Nim Chimpsky, had a vocabulary of 125 signs that he used with stunning
accuracy." Chimpanzees' communication development mirrors that of a
human child ." The similarities are quite profound.
Despite the biological and physiological resemblance to us, the
laws of the United States relegate chimpanzees to the same legal category
as a car, a sponge, and at one time, a human slave-legal property." Indeed,
our current legal framework in this respect labels most beings as either
persons with rights or chattel, with no rights." Although animals, as a
whole, have not fared well in challenging the legal dichotomy of the
traditional person-or-property grouping, there has been both subtle and
remarkable progress for animal rights here and abroad. After 200 years,
France, for example, amended its Civil Code to recognize animals as
"living sentient beings" as opposed to the mere property of its owner." New
Zealand followed suit this past May in declaring animals as sentient
beings ." Both Germany and Switzerland were early pioneers to the
recognition of animals as more than property and entitled to rights ." Spain
has gone even further with respect to great apes by passing landmark
legislation to enshrine them with human rights." The United States has also
taken incremental steps to further protect and enhance the quality of life for
our close relatives by effectively ending their compulsory role in research."
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) recently published its final rule
which eliminates the separation classification of captive and wild

20/d.

Tim Radford & Stephen Moss, Family Matters, THEGUARDIAN, (Nov. 11,20159:30 PM),
http://www.theguardian.comlscience/2003/may/21/research.highereducation.
22 Jd.
23 Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, From Prop erty to Person: The Case ofEvelyn Hart, II Seton
Hall CONST. LJ. 1,2 (2000).
24 I d.
25 Animals in France Finally Recognized as 'Living, Sentient Beings,' RT (Nov . 11,20159:35
PM), https :l/www.rt.comlnews/227431-animals-sentient-furniture-parliament!.
26 Sophine McIntyre, Animals are now legally recognised as 'sentient' beings in New Zealand,
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 11,20159:30 PM),
http ://www.independent.co.uklnews/worldlaustralasialanimals-are-now-Iegally-recognised-assentient-beings-in-new-zealand-I 0256006.htrnl.
21 Kate Connolly, German Animals Given Legal Rights , THEGUARDIAN, (Nov . 11,20159:30
PM) http ://www.theguardian.comlworldl2002/junl22/gcrmany.animalwelfare.
28 Lee Glendinning, Spanish Parliament Approves 'HI/man Rights 'for Apes, THEGUARDIAN,
(Nov. 04,20159:30 PM),
http://www.theguardian.comlworldl2008/junl26Ihumanrights.animalwelfare.
29 Wayne Pacelle, At Long Last, Testing on Chimps to End in the United States - and the World,
THE HUMANE SOCIETYWAYNEPACELLE'S BLOG (Nov. 11,20159:30 PM) ,
http ://blog.humancsociety.org/wayne/2015 /09/testing-on-chimpanzees-ends.html.
21
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chimpanzees under the ESA." Effective as of September 14, 2015, the
entire species, "wherever found," are now considered endangered and
protected under the ESA ." This means that all activities involving the usc
chimpanzees will require a permit-The issuance of a permit will be for
scientific purposes only and the applicant must show that the purpose is to
benefit chimpanzees in the wild or "enhance the propagation or survival of
the affected species." » Although progress is slowing moving forward, the
recent developments, such as the FWS rule change, still preserves the
person-or-property legal dichotomy that has prevented chimpanzees from
seeking relief in court.
The purpose of this article is not only to accentuate the correlative
traits of close relatives but also urge the courts to formally recognize their
legal status as something more than mere property. Ideally , an issue of this
magnitude should be, and is best, addressed by the legislative branch .
However, the courts have historically served as the ultimate safeguard in
ensuring that the minorities are not oppressed or denied rights by the
majority in power."
Part I examines the current and historical utilization of common
law to effectuate change in jurisdictions throughout the United States.
Understanding common law and how it works will serve as the principal
foundation for appreciating how it can be used to incrementally advance
the legal status of chimpanzees.
Part II addresses the contemporary legal structure for animal law in
court. The current Article III "standing" doctrine in relation to third-party
plaintiffs seeking to protect non-human animals and the environment will
be discussed in the first section. This section will also discuss the
prudential standing doctrine and how it is affected by the citizen-suit
provision in the Endangered Species Act. The next section will discuss the
history of common law habeas corpus and the seminal case where it was
utilized to give personhood status to a legal human property. The next
section will discuss the modern common law habeas corpus structure and
how it is currently interpreted in relation to its applicability to confined
non-human animals. The following section examines why the courts are the
appropriate branch to determine who is a legal person. The section will also
address the constitutional approaches to personhood for captive non-human
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing All Chimpanzees as Endangered
Species, 80 Fed. Reg. 34,500 (June 16,2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
31 [d.
32 Final Rule to List All Chimpanzees as Captive and Wild as Endangered Questions and
Answers, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE (Nov. 20, 2015, 5:45 PM),
http ://www.fws.govlhome/feature/2015/pdfs/ChimpanzeeFinaIRuleFAQs.pdf.
33 [d.
l4 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) .
30
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animals via the Thirteenth Amendment. The final subpart will discuss
corporations and how the courts have been utilized to expand their rights as
"legal persons ." The discussion of corporations is dispositive to this paper
because it is a clear illustration of how the determination of legal "persons"
is not confined by biological constraints.
Part III offers a proposal to help advance protections for
chimpanzees. It proposes that the courts' common law should be modified
to comport with the existing moral and scientific standards to allow
chimpanzees limited personhood status when challenging abuse and
inhumane conditions in its place of captivity. It proposes a limited
expansion of common law habeas corpus for chimpanzees in those
circumstances. It also recommends a limited personhood expansion to
allow chimpanzees to meet legal "standing" requirements so they can sue
on their own behalf with counsel under the Endangered Species Act. The
article concludes that these proposed reforms do not create a slippery slope
problem requiring legal personhood protections to extend beyond this
limited content.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF COMMON LAW AND ANIMAL PROPERTY
STATUS

Common law throughout the United States has historically
recognized the legal status of animals as tangible property ." Traditionally,
the remedy for the intentional destruction or injury of an animal typically
gave the owner an actionable right to seek damages for the loss of
inanimate forms of property > The Supreme Court of Idaho summed up this
traditional view when it said:
"It is a long-held legal maxim that animals are tangible property
and that intentional acts leading to the destruction or loss of such chattels
give rise to a cause of action for conversion.'» This anachronistic common
law view has hindered the advancement of animals as a whole, and it has
also enabled courts to deny the importance animals have on the human
psyche."
See Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad Co., 166 U.S. 698, 700 (1897); Parker v,
Mise, 27 Ala. 480 (Ala. 1855); Kinsman v. State, 77 Ind. 132, 133 (Ind. 1881); Perry v. Phipps,
32 N.C. 259,260 (N.C. 1849); Wheatley V. Harris, 36 Tenn. 468, 469 (Tn. 1857); McDennent v ,
Taft, 75 A. 276 (Vt. 1910).
36 Meekins v. Simpson, 96 S.E. 894, 894 (N.C. 1918).
31 Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 732 P.2d 661, 664 (Ind. 1986) (quoting
Graham v. Smith, 100 Ga. 434, 28 S.E. 225 (Ga. 1897».
38 See generally Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that a passenge r could not recover emotional distress damages based upon loss of
3l
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U.S. common law is derived from the common law courts of
England and its general principles have been recognized by state courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court." Some of our common law systems include the
unwritten laws of England as well as laws created by courts through
judicial interpretation and are wholly different from laws created by
legislative process.s As the Supreme Court of Illinois succinctly stated in a
recent case: "[c]ommon law is simply the body of law derived from judicial
decisions rather than from statutes or constitutions .?« Traditionally ,
common law has been utilized, modified and abandoned by our courts to
help ensure our laws comport with societal change and to avoid injustice
notwithstanding tradition and clear precedent to the contrary." The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania emphasized the core understanding of common
law's adaptability when it stated that "[G]eneral faithfulness to precedent is
not sufficient justification to buttress judicial decisions proven wrong in
principle or which are unsuited to modern experience and which no longer
adequately serve the interests of justice. Common law permits adjustment
and development in the law . . . ."
Common law is a powerful mechanism for change in American
law. Illustrations of its breadth and flexibility are exhaustive . There are
countless cases from high courts throughout the United States changing
laws through common law in many contexts including torts," and in
Hoffman v. Jones , the Florida Supreme Court held that the common law
rule of contributory negligence, which had been in force in Florida since
property when her dog died after suffering a heat stroke in the cargo hold of airplane); See also
Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. 1988) ("Companionship is included in the concept of
consortium, which is a right growing out of a marriage relationship . .. Under no circumstances,
under the law of Pennsylvania, may there be recovery for loss of companionship due to the death
of an animal") (citations omitted).
39 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1834) ("When the ancestors of the citizens of the
United States migrated to this country, they brought with them, to a limited extent, the English
common law, as part of their heritage."); Peery v. Fletcher, 182 P. 143, 146 (Or. 1919) (The
common law, as it existed in England at the time of the settlement of the American colonies, has
never been in force in all of its provisions in any colony or state of the United States.").
40 Hogan v. State, 441 P.2d 620, 621 (Nev. 1968).
41 Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 948 N.E.2d I, 16 (Ill. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
42 See Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz. 1983) ("[T]he common law, which is judgemade and judge-applied, can and will be changed when changed conditions and circumstances
establish that it is unjust or has become bad public policy."); In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., Inc., 510
N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ind. 1987) ("[T]he common law of today is not a frozen mold of ancient ideas,
but such law in active and dynamic and thus changes with the times and growth of society to meet
its need."); Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 931 (Md. 1980) ("[I]t may also be changed by judicial
decision if this Court is convinced that it has become unsound in the circumstances of modem
life.").
43 Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 352 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
44 See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
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1886, was outmoded in light of the new conditions and circumstances.
Relying on common law, the court explained that "[w]hen grave doubt
exists of a true common law doctrine ... we may ... exercise a 'broad
discretion' taking 'into account the changes in our social and economic
customs and present day conceptions of right and justice,"> In the criminal
law context, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Price v. State held that
the common law inconsistent verdict rule could no longer be justified or
tolerated-The court relied on the flexibility of common law when it stated
that "[b]ecause of the inherent dynamism of the common law, we have
consistently held that it is subject to judicial modification in light of [new]
circumstances." In the context of labor law, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the common law doctrine of "no work, no pay," which had
been in force since 1859, no longer comported with modem-day labor
jurisprudence." The court detailed its ability, and at times its necessity, to
change the common law by stating that common law must "remain in
consonance with society's needs . .. and must, change when change is
appropriate.".. The court explained that neither the doctrine of stare decisis
nor the weight of time is proper justification to perpetuate law that no
longer conforms to contemporary standards > The common thread in these
illustrative examples is the premise that the high court of each state has the
ability to shape common law jurisprudence to conform to contemporary
standards ."
II.

CONTEMPORARY LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR ANIMAL LAW IN COURT

A. Article III Standing and Third-Party Limitations
The current legal framework provides that in order for an
individual to bring suit, the party must satisfy the threshold question of
[d. at 435 .
See Price v. State, 949 A.2d 619, 630 (Md. 2008).
41 [d. at 627 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
48 See State v , International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers , Local 195, 780
A.2d 525 (N.J. 2001).
49 [d. at 534.
so [d. ("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.") (internal
~uotations om itted) (citation omitted).
1 See gen erally State v. Hutton. No. 14-0603,2015 WL 3822814, at *13 (W. Va. June 16,2015)
(using common law power to modify the common law writ of errors coram nobis) ; State v,
Picotte , 2003 WI 42, ~ 5, 261 Wis. 2d 249,254,661 N.W.2d 381, 383 (abrogating the year-and-aday rule) ; Borns ex reI. Gannon v. Voss, 2003 WY 74, 'Ill , 70 P.3d 262, 264 (Wyo. 2003)
(modifying tort duly with respects to dangerous dogs) .
45

46
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whether they have "standing" to satisfy the "Case and Controversy"
requirement under Article III." The "constitutional minimum[s]" require
that the plaintiff meet the three elements: (1) the plaintiff must suffer an
injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant and not the result of some third party not
before the court ; and (3) it must be likely, rather than speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision ."
1.

Injury

Perhaps the largest obstacle for third-party plaintiffs to overcome is
the injury element." Moreover, the concreteness and particularity of the
injury is even more so difficult." This is because the question of injury only
extends to the injury that the person-the one who is bringing the suit-is
harmed." Justice Stewart, in Sierra Club v. Morton, explained that "the
'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It
requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.">
In Sierra Club v. Morton, representatives of the Sierra Club
brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act against the
Department of the Interior to prevent the development of a multi-million
dollar complex comprising of hotels and restaurants in the Mineral King
Valley." The complaint alleged that the development would harm, "destroy
or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and
wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future
generations."» It was the inaccessibility of the area that warranted the
construction of roads and power lines." The Sierra Club sought to preserve
the quality of the valley by maintaining its remoteness and wilderness-like
features." The Court acknowledged that aesthetic and environmental wellbeing can be used as an element to establish 'injury in fact.' » Ultimately,
however, the Court concluded that the Sierra Club did not have standing

S2

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) .

s3

ld. at 560-561.

Stacey L. Gordon, The Legal Rights ofAll Living Things: How Animal Law Can Extend the
Environmental Movement 's Quest for Legal Standing for Non-Human Animals 214, in WHAT
CM, ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAw? (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015) .
5S ld.
56 1d.
57 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S . 727, 734-35 (1972) (emphasis added).
58 ld. at 729-730.
S9 1d. at 734.
60 Gordon, supra note 54, at 214.
61 1d.
62 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734 .
54

ANESTAL

FaIl 2017

CHIMPANZEES IN COURT

85

since it failed to allege that it or its members' activities or pastimes would
be affected by the Disney development."
In the non-human animal context, Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Glickman, provides a solid case example of how the aesthetic injury in
observing animals live in inhumane conditions can satisfy the injury in-fact
requirement." The plaintiff, trained in wildlife rehabilitation and
investigating complaints about the treatment of wildlife, began visiting the
Long Island Game Farm Park and Zoo to assess the living condition of the
animals in the facilities." The plaintiff visited the facility at least nine
times." During his visits, the plaintiff witnessed a number of inhumane
conditions." The plaintiff witnessed the continued isolation of a Japanese
Snow Macaque, Samantha, and a large male chimpanzee, Barney, which in
turn made him upset since he knew that chimpanzees are very social
animals." The plaintiff also observed the fright and extreme agitation of
squirrel monkeys being caged next to adult bears,« After several
unsuccessful attempts to have the USDA rectify the inhumane
psychological conditions, the plaintiff sued." The court held that the
plaintiff had in fact sustained an injury and had legal standing to bring his
action into federal court." The court highlighted a number of cases
demonstrating that standing can be based on affronts to aesthetic interest
and the showing of an actual animal death is not needed." The court further
reasoned that it would make no logical sense to suppose that people can
only sustain aesthetic harm from government action that threatens to
eliminate a species, and not action that allows animals to be in a constant
state of suffering."
2. Causation
The next element for legal standing requires the plaintiff to show
that the injury sustained is "fairly traceable" to the acts of the defendant ,

Id. at 735.
See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426,431 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en bane).
65 I d. at 429.
63
04

66
67

Id.
Id.

68 /d.

Id. at 430.
Id.
71 Id. at 431. ("Mr. Jumove's allegations solidly establish injury in fact.").
n [d. at 437.

69

70

73

Id. at 438.
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and not the consequence of the independent act of an absent third party that
is not currently before the court ."
Massachusetts v. EPA illustrates how even minor contributions to
one's injury are enough to establish causation ." In that case, a collective
group of private organizations and states sought review of the EPA's
decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions." Injury was found in the
substantial loss of state owned coastal property caused by global warming."
The EPA did not argue the existence of a causal connection between
manufactured greenhouse gas emissions and global warming> Although
the EPA did not dispute this issue, the dissent explained that since the
global warming phenomenon was the result of a myriad of additional
factors, including global greenhouse gas contributions, it makes the causal
connection "far too speculative.">
The issue of causation is also addressed in Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Glickman » The causation element was illuminated by the
traceability of the Secretary of Agriculture 's Animal Welfare Act (AWA)
rules when a third party was in fact responsible for the animal's living
condition that resulted in the plaintiff's injury." The court sided with the
plaintiff in finding causation where a government action permitted a third
party's conduct that results in an injury , when the conduct would have been
otherwise illegal » It held that the USDA's failure to adopt the specific,
minimum standards that the AWA requires allowed for the injury and
regulation that is in accordance with the AWA would have prohibited the
inhumane conditions and protected the plaintiff from injury.
3. Redressability
The last element requires it to be "likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."..The
Massachusetts v. EPA case illustrates that even a slight relief in the
plaintiff's injury by simply slowing down the rate of harm will be sufficient

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
76 Id. at 513- 14.
77 Id. at 522.
" Id. at 523.
79 Id. at 543 (Robert' s dissent).
80 Glickman , 154 F.3d at 438 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en bane).
81 Gordon, supra note 54, at 219.
"' Glickman , 154 F.3d at 442 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(cn bane).
83 Def enders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations omitted).
74

75
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to satisfy the redressability requirement ." In that case, the plaintiffs alleged
that the rise in sea levels , in which global-warming has been named the
principal culprit, has and will continue to harm the State of Massachusetts ."
The EPA argued that its refusal to regulate the
emissions
contributed so trivially to the injury of the plaintiffs , especially in light of
the large greenhouse gas contributions from foreign nations such as India
and China." The Court rejected the EPA's arguments in this respect finding
that accepting that line of logic would "doom most challenges to regulatory
action.'> Although the Court conceded the EPA's assertion that any ruling
would only have a minor impact on an issue as internationally driven as
global warming, the Court responded by stating: "[A] plaintiff satisfies the
redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will
relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable
decision will relieve his every injury ."u
In Lujan , however , the Court found flaws in the plaintiffs'
challenge of, what it deemed "a more generalized Government action."..
The Court reasoned that challenges to Government programs established to
implement the legal duties that may run afoul of the law , rather than
allegations claiming specified and identifiable violations, have no place in
the federal jurisdictional purview." A dispositive fact in this case was that
the agencies funding the projects that were allegedly causing alleged harm
to the plaintiffs were not parties to the suit." To compound this issue, the
Government also rejected the position that the Secretary of Interior had any
legal authority to bind the funding agencies if there was a favorable ruling
by the Court ." Also , the agencies funding the projects abroad provided less
than 10% of the funding ." These facts proved fatal for the plaintiffs'
redressability claim. The Court reasoned that the first two problematic facts
made the plaintiffs' case not redressable because relief would require the
respondents to terminate its project funding, which was not likely possible
84 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) ("While it may be true that regulating motorvehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack
jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.") ,
8S Id. at 526 .

86/d.
87 Id.

at 524. ("Its argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step,
because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum .") .
88 Id. at 525. (quot ing Larson v, Valente, 456 U.S. 228 {I 982» (Intern al quotations omitted).
89

De/enders a/ Wildlife, 504 U.S . at 568 .

90 Id.

{quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 {I 984).

91 Id.
92
93

Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 569 .
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considering the Secretary's lack of control over the agencies actually
funding the alleged injury » The Court also concluded that the funding by
the agencies so insignificant that "it is entirely conjectural whether the nonagency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by the
agency activity they seek to achieve ," thus eliminating the plaintiffs'
standing claim."
4. Prudential Standing and the Endangered Species Act's Citizen Suit
Provision
Standing under Article III is the "irreducible constitutional
minimum" plaintiffs must show to demonstrate jurisdiction of the court." It
is the core and unchanging part of the "case and controversy requirement.?«
Courts have created prudential standing as its own additional layer to the
analysis and it is purely discretionary." Under this added requirement, the
courts will not adjudicate claims brought as "generalized grievances"
shared by a large class and cases where a plaintiff is resting his or her claim
to relief on the legal rights or interest of a third party." This analysis
generally applies when there is no statute granting the plaintiff the right to
seek review by the court,» The Supreme Court requires a plaintiff show
that his or her interest falls within the "zone of interest" protected by a
statute from which the cause of action arises from.»
Notwithstanding a
plaintiff satisfying the Article III requirements, courts are permitted to
decline to hear his or her case based on prudential limitations ."" This
judicially created requirement does have its limitations, however, and it
will not be considered when Congress legislates expressly to negate it,»
"Citizen-suit provisions," as they are commonly known allow
citizens to bring a cause of action under specific statutes ,« These provisions
have the effect of relieving plaintiffs from prudential standing
requirements> Citizen suit provisions arc not automatic gateways into
court because plaintiffs still must meet Article III standing requirements.»
94

Id. at 57 I.

95 [d.

ss Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
97Id.
98 Gordon, supra note 54, at 222.
99 Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499, (1975) .
100 Gordon , supra note 54, at 222.
10 1 [d.
102 Katherine A. Burke, Comment, Can We Standfor It? Amending the Endangered Species Act
with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 633, 643 (2004).
10) Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997).
104 Gordon, supra note 54, at 222.
lOS [d.
106

[d.
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Article In standing cannot be side-stepped by an act of congress.r The
future of prudential standing has been thrown into question, however, by
the Court's recent holding that explicitly rejected the notion that an
otherwise actionable case under Article III could be denied solely based on
judicially created prudential considerations. «
With respect to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) ,'" it has its own
citizen-suit provision which provides that "any person may commence a
civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person ... who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter.": The Supreme Court has
interpreted the breadth of the citizen suit provision both broadly and
narrowly.'" The term "person" is defined as "an individual , corporation,
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity . . . or any other
entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States .?« Theoretically,
animals that are protected under ESA should qualify as an "entity subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States." : Does this quotation encompass both
the broad and narrow interpretations mentioned by Davidson?
The standing requirements have made third-party suits, on behalf
of animals, especially difficult to sustain in federal court.« With respect to
non-human animals, there has been some success in getting their names
listed in case captions,'" as well as legal standing to bring suit in their own

107 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. ("[T]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated
public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an individual right vindicable in
the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's
most important constitutional duty, to take Care that the Laws be faithfully cxccuted[]") (internal
jtuotations omitted).
I 8 Lexmark Int'l.Jnc. v, Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014) ("Just as
a court cannot apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress
has denied, it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because "prudence"
dictates.") (citations omitted).
109 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
110 Id. § I540(g) (emphasis added) .
III Burke, supra note 102, at 648; Compare Lujan v. Defend ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992) (interpreting the citizen-suit provision narrowly to prevent citizens from maintaining
lawsuit seeking enforcement by the Secretary ofInterior), with Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
163 (1997) (interpreting the citizen-suit provision broadly to encompass plain tiffs who sought to
~revent the implementation of environmental restrictions).
12 16 U.S.C . §§ 1532(13) (2012) (emphasis added).
113 Joanna B. Wymyslo, Standingfor Endangered Species: Justiciability Bey ond Humanity, 15 U.
SALT. J. ENvTL. L. 45 (2007).
114 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562; see also Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493
(2009) .
115 See Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) ;
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461 (3d Cir. 1997); Coho Salmon v. Pacific Lumber
Co ., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (N .D. Cal. 1999); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia
County, 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998).
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right.« In Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, the Sierra
Club brought an action on behalf of the endangered Palila bird asserting
that the Department's decision permitting feral goats and sheep to graze in
the Palila's critical habitat was a prohibited "taking" under the ESA.'" The
court held that the Palila had standing as a plaintiff in its own right, stating:
"As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act . . . the bird
(Loxioides bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also
has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiffin its own
right?» The holding permitted the Sierra Club to act as its representing
attorney.'" This apparent legal victory, however, has since been revisited to
make clear that the language relied on by other courts to grant non-human
animals standing was merely nonbinding dicta.»
B. The Applicability ofthe Common Law Writ ofHabeas Corpus to Non Persons
While the issue of standing has been vigorously argued, it is largely a
procedural hurdle that does not raise any substantive issue. Lawyers have
argued for the advancement of rights for non-human animals based on an
array of legal theories. Some of the more recent challenges include arguing
for common law habeas relief. This approach , although new in application
to nonhuman animals, has been argued to expand rights to people who were
once considered property.
1. The Somerset Case and the Historical Application of Habeas Corpus to
Non-persons
Habeas corpus, Latin for "that you have the body," is defined by
Black's Law Dictionary as "a writ employed to bring a person before a

court, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention
is not illegal.?» It is also known as the Great Writ.»
The writ of habeas corpus, in American law, is considered "a vital
instrument for the protection of individual liberty . . . ," m The Supreme
Court has explained that the purpose of the writ is to "[p]rovide a prompt
116See Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp . 1170, 1177 (M.D .
Fla. 1995); Marbled Murrelet v , Pacific Lumber Co ., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
117 Palila , 852 F.2d at 1107.
us [d.
119 Id. (emphasis added) .
120 Cetacean Community. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004) ("After due consideration,
we agree with the district court that Palila IV's statements are nonbinding dicta .").
121 Habeas Corpus , BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY (lOth ed. 2014).
122 [d.
123 Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 725 (2008) .
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and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable
restraints.? » State courts have similarly held that the "[t]he great purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is the immediate delivery of the party deprived of
personal liberty."> Prior to the Civil War, slaves, were considered as
property , not persons, and were not capable of seeking habeas relief » The
Kentucky Supreme Court summarized the repulsive reality for human slave
under the U.S. Constitution in the Nineteenth Century:
It cannot be pretended that any rights secured to the slave by the
constitution ... for there are no rights secured to slaves by the constitution
... Slaves, although they are human beings, are by our laws placed on the
same footing with living property of the brute creation. However deeply it
may be regretted, and whether it be politic or impolitic, a slave by our
code, is not treated as a person, but (negotium), a thing, as he stood in the
civil code ofthe Roman Empire »

One of the most significant and famous cases applying common
law writ of habeas corpus to legal property is the English case of Somerset
v. Stewart» James Somerset was an African kidnapped at the age of seven
and sold to Charles Stewart in Virginia> Under Virginia Law, Somerset
was considered the property of Stewart> Stewart, who was a customs
officer, brought Somerset to England to sojoum,» Somerset absconded in
England for about two months before being caught by Stewart» Stewart
then forced Somerset to stow on a ship called Ann and Mary that was
scheduled to leave for Jamaica.» Stewart punished Somerset's rebellion by
selling him to hard labor in the sugar cane fields > He forced Somerset to
stow on a ship called Ann and Mary that was scheduled to leave for
124 Harris

v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Pires, 777 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Mass. 2002) (citations
omitted); see also Bryarly v. Howard, 73 N.E.2d 678, 679 (Ind. 1947) ("The purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to bring the person in custody before the court for inquiry into the cause of
restraint."); Murray v. Regier, 872 So . 2d 217,222 (Fla. 2002) ("[T]he traditional purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to furnish a speedy hearing and remedy to one whose liberty is
unlawfully restrained") .
126 See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S . 393 (1856).
127 Jarman v , Patterson, 23 Ky . 644 , 645-46 (Ky. 1828).
128 Lofft 1,98 Eng . Rep. 499 (1772).
129 Steven M. Wise , The Entitlement Of Chimpanzees to The Common La w Writs ofHabeas
Corpus and De Homine Replegiando, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. 1. REv. 219 , 263 (2007).
130 Id.
131 Derek A. Webb, The Somerset Effect: Parsing Lord Mansfield's Words on Slavery in
Nineteenth Century America, 32 LAW & HIST. REv. 455 (2014).
132 Id. at 455-56.
133 [d. at 456.
134 Wise, supra note 129, at 264.
125 See
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Jamaica» Aboard Ann and Mary, Somerset was in the custody ofthe ship's
captain, Captain Knowles» While Somerset was shackled on the ship,«
three Londoners went before Lord Mansfield and applied for a writ of
habeas corpus> Lord Mansfield then issued the writ and ordered that
Somerset be brought before the Court of King's Bench , which had
temporary dominion over Somerset,» and required Captain Knowles to
show cause for his detainment of Somerset>
Considering the fact that human slavery was a significant
economic machine and was still legal in England, the legal and political
ramifications of relieving Somerset by writ of habeas corpus were
immeasurable.v Notwithstanding the external factors, Lord Mansfield used
his judicial power to grant Somerset habeas relief stating: "If the parties
will have judgment, fiat justitiarn ruat ere/urn, let justice be done whatever
be the consequence.?« Lord Mansfield found the practice of slavery,
despite its legality, "so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it." ..,
With Lord Mansfield's order, James Somerset, once legal property, walked
out of the King's Bench discharged, free, and a person under the law .."
2.

Contemporary Applications of Habeas Corpus to Non-persons

The property-or-person legal dichotomy is still as cutting-edge
today as it was for Lord Mansfield centuries ago, « The courts are now
confronting the issue of whether habeas corpus can apply to non-human
animals. '~ A series of cases were brought by the Nonhuman Rights Project
on behalf of chimpanzees Kiko,« Tommy,« Hercules and Leo- with the

!d. at 456.
Lofft 1,98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772) .
137 Wise, supra note 129, at 264.
m Webb, supra note 131, at 456.
139 Id.
140 Lofft 1,98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772).
141 Wise, supra note 129, at 271.
142 Lofft 1,98 Eng. Rep . 499, 509 (1772).
143 Id. at 509.
144 Id. at 510.
145 See gen erally Brandon Keirn, Chimpanzee Rights Get a Day in Court , WIRED (Nov. OS, 2015,
8:34 PM) , http://www.wired.com/20 I5/05/chimpanzee-rights-get-day-court/.
146 See People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y .S.2d 248 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2014) ; Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rei. Kiko v. Presti, 999 N.Y.s.2d 652 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015) leave to appeal denied, 126 A.D.3d 1430 (N.Y. App . Div. 2015) leave to appeal
denied, 38 N.E.3d 827 (N.Y. 2015).
147 Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex reI. Kiko v. Presti, 124 A.D .3d 1334 (N.Y . App . Div.
2015) .
148 People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App . Div.
2014).
135
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goal of providing them relief by the court, through common law writ of
habeas corpus, to effectuate their respective release.
In People ex reI. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, the
Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) brought suit on behalf of a chimpanzee
known as Tommy> The suit was precipitated by the NhRP upon
discovering the former circus chimp living inside a small steel-mesh cell
that had a rancid milk-musk odor,» Tommy was relegated to a bam-sized
aluminum-sided shed with small windows at the rear of a property,» owned
by Patrick Lavery ,'" that was used to sell transport trailers in Gloversville,
New York» NhRP sought an order to show cause to commence a habeas
corpus proceeding under C .P.L.R. article 70 based on the claim that
Tommy was being illegally detained > NhRP also compiled and submitted
several affidavits from experts outlining the cognitive complexities of
chimpanzees in support of its petition» The affidavits documented that
chimpanzees possessed similar cognitive traits as humans in that they are,
among other things, autonomous, self-aware, and self-determined> The
trial court found that the chimpanzee was not a "person" for the purposes of
C.P .L.R. article 70 and ruled that the order to show cause cannot be
signed»
The appeals court recognized that the question of whether Tommy
was a person within C.P.L.R. article 70 was novel and the first of its kind.«
With this backdrop, the court held that a "chimpanzee is not a 'person'
entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas
corpus.t'- The court explained that the word "person" was purposely left
149 Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rei. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2015).
ISO Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
151 Charles Siebert, Should a Chimp Be Able to Sue Its Owner?, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov . 05, 2015, 9:00
PM), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/2 7Imagazine/the-rights-of-man-and-beast.html?_FO.
152 l d.
153 Lavery, 998 N.Y .S.2d at 248.
154 Charles Siebert, Should a Chimp Be Able to Sue Its Owner? , N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 05, 2015,
9:00 PM), http: //www.nytimes.com/20 14/04/2 7/magazine/thc-rights-of-man-andbeast.html? FO.
155 Lavery, 998 N.Y .S.2d at 249.; see generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7002 (McKinney) ("By whom
made. A person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty within the state, or one
acting on his behalf or a party in a child abuse proceeding subsequent to an order of the family
court, may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such
detention and for deliverance. A judge authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus having
evidence, in a judicial proceeding before him, that any person is so detained shall, on his own
initiative, issue a writ of habeas corpus for the relief of that person.") (emphasis added).
'56Id.
157 ld.
158

Id.

159 Id.

160 Id.
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undefined by the legislature to ensure that it did not "change the instances
in which the writ was available, which has been determined by the slow
process of decisional accretion.".., The court began its analysis by
highlighting the historical fact that animals have never been considered
eligible for habeas corpus relief nor have they ever been considered capable
of asserting rights for the purposes of state or federal law,» The court
acknowledged that just becau se there is a lack of precedent regarding the
applicability of habeas corpus to animals, the writ's "great flexibility and
vague scope" orders the issue be inquired in full> The court emphasized
that chimpanzees are incapable of bearing legal duties, carrying social
responsibility, and being held legally accountable for their actions ...• In
detailing its reasoning for denying Tommy habeas corpus, the court
discussed its legal theory that a "person" must have the ability to engage in
the "social contract." > The court spelled out this theory by stating:

Reciprocity between rights and responsibilities stems from principles of
social contract, which inspired the ideals offreedom and democracy at the
core of our system ofgovernment. Under this view, society extends rights in
exchange for an express or implied agreement from its members to submit
to social responsibilities. In other words, "rights [are] connected to moral
agency and the ability to accept societal responsibility in exchange for
[those] rights:'>
The next case in this trilogy, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex reI.
Kiko v. Presti» concerned a chimpanzee, known as Kiko , who lives in a
cage at the home of Carmen Presti in Niagara Falls, New York,« This case
came on appeal from the Supreme Court , which dismissed NhRP's petition
for habeas corpus. « The Fourth Department affirmed the Supreme Court's

161 !d. (quoting People ex ref. Keitt v. McMann, 220 N.E .2d 653 (N.Y . 1966) (internal quotation
omitted).
162 ld. at 249-50. ("Petitioner does not cite any precedent-and there appears to be none-in state
law, or under English common law, that an animal couLdbe considered a "p erson" for the
purposes of common-law habeas corpus relief. In fact, habeas corpus relief has never been
Erovided to any nonhuman entity. ").
63 Id . at 250.
164 Id. at 251.
16S Id. at 250.
166

1d.

167 Nonhuman

Rights Project, Inc., ex reI. Kiko v. Presti , 124 A.D.3d 1334 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015).
168 Michael Mountain, Bios on the Chimpanzees in New York Lawsuits, NONHUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT (Nov. 05, 2015, 9:59 PM), http ://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/11130Ibios-onthe-chi mpanzees-in-n ew-york -Iawsuits/.
169 Presti. 124 A.D.3d at 1335.
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ruling to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus,» The reasoning, however,
was not based on whether Kiko was a "person" capable of asserting habeas
corpus rights , but that NhRP was not seeking Kiko's immediate release »
The NhRP sought to have Kiko transferred from its current place that was
alleged to be unsuitable, to a facility selected by The North American
Primate Sanctuary Alliance.« The court reasoned that a habeas corpus
claim can only lie where the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from
confinement, not a transfer from one confinement to another > The court
assumed, arguendo, that even if Kiko was a person, habeas corpus is not
available for the purpose of changing the conditions of its confinement»
The final case, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rei. Hercules &
Leo v. Stanley, concerned two young adult chimpanzees, known as
Hercules and Leo , who are being held at Stony Brook University > The two
are used as research subjects in the study of locomotion for chimpanzee s
and other primates, and the NhRP sought habeas corpus relief for their
release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida » NhRP did not challenge the
conditions of their confinement , nor did they allege that Stanley violated
any state or federal law . m
In denying NhRP 's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court
focused its analysis on the issue of whether chimpanzees can be considered
a "person" and whether it was bound by the Third Department's decision in
People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery » The court first
acknowledged that the word "person" is not defined nor is it synonymous
with being a human being.'" The court also noted the increasing recognition
of non-human animals, specifically pets, as more than just property by the
courts and the legislatures. ' '' While the court thoughtfully discussed both
primary and secondary sources that are either for or against the extension

Id.
Id. Compare with People ex reI. Nonhuman Rights Project , Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248
(N .Y. App . Div. 2014) .
172 .
Id
173 Id.
174
Id.
175 Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rei. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898, 900 (N.Y .
Sup. Ct. 2015).
176
Id.
177 Id. at 901.
178 1d. at 911-18.
179 1d. at 911.
180 1d. at 912. ("[Plets and companion animals, are gradually being treated as more than property,
if not quite as persons , in part because legislatures and courts recognize the close relationships
that exist between people and their pets , who are often viewed and treated by their owners as
family members.").
170
171
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of legal personhood status for non-human animals, it ultimately declined to
make its own determination on the issue.'"
The court then analyzed New York's stare decisis jurisprudence
and found that the Third Department's decision was controlling absent an
on point decision by the Court of Appeals or Appellate Division within its
judicial department » The court even went further in its opinion, in dicta,
by stating: "Even were I not bound by the Third Department in Lavery , the
issue of a chimpanzee's right to invoke the writ of habeas corpus is best
decided, if not by the Legislature, then by the Court of Appeals, given its
role in setting state policy."»
C. Constitutional Approaches for Personhood Applied to Non-Human
Animals

1. The Courts Have the Role of Determining Who is a Legal Person
The word "person" is a term of art,.. that has been construed to
equate to human personality or a form of legal fiction unrelated to human
biology.« With that, the legislature plays a crucial role in determining who
can be a legal person since its principal function is to enact legislation
addressing policy and creating law,« Ultimately, however, it is the courts
that will interpret the words of the legislature and give them legal meaning.
'" When constitutions, statutes , and case law precedent are absent, the
common law prevails and courts are free to apply it accordingly >
Although courts have confronted this issue throughout history» no
decision has drawn more attention to the issue than Roe v. Wade.'" In that
case, the Court acknowledged that the Constitution does not have a

181 / d.

at 912-15.
Id . at 916-17.
183 Id . at 917.
184 Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hosp ., Inc., 704 So.2d 778,780 (La. 1997).
18S Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons : The Language of A Legal Fiction ,
114 HARV. 1. REv. 1745 (2001) .
186 In re Involuntary Dissolution of Wiles Bros., Inc., 830 N.W.2d 474, 481 (Neb. 2013) ("[I]t is
the Legislature's function through the enactment of statutes to declare what is the law and public
Eolicy ." ).
87 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."); Turner v. Georgia River Network, 773 S.E.2d 706,
709 (Ga. 2015) ("[S]tatutory construction belongs to the courts, legislat ion to the legislature .").
188 People v. Woolfolk, 857 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Mich. 2014) ("[T]he cornmon law prevails except
as abrogated by the Constitution, the Legislature, or this Court.") (alteration in original).
189 See State v. Gyles, 313 So.2d 799 (La. 1975) (holding fetus not a person within the meaning of
murder statute); Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospital. Corp ., 286 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y. 1972)
(holding that state and federal law do not consider the unborn a legal person.),
190 410 U.S. 113 (1973) .
182
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definition of the word "person.": With this lack of clear constitutional
guidance, the Court concluded that the unborn were not included in the
word "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment » The Court detailed the historical treatment of fetuses, under
common law , and their legal significance as persons before and after
'quickening.' « The Court noted the theories that vacillated since the
Thirteenth Century and the endless debates among philosophers and
theologians,» The Court concluded that the common law never firmly
established the destruction of a quick fetus as a crime,» The Court also
relied on constitutional evidence that showed the use of the word 'person'
has application only postnatally»
The legal significance of personhood is most profound, in regards
to legal consequence, in the crirninallaw context > In State v. Courchesne,
a defendant charged with murder appealed his conviction on, among other
grounds, the assertion that the unborn child was not considered a person
within the meaning of Connecticut's homicide and capital felony statute »
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in an opinion that spans 166 pages,
ruled that an infant, if "born alive," is a person within the meaning of the
state's homicide statutes.r The court relied on the common law "born
alive" rule and it served as its basis for recognizing an otherwise non-legal
person as a person under Connecticut law>
In the context of non-human animals, the Court of Appeals of
Oregon confronted an issue of first impression when it considered whether
a horse is a "person" under the "emergency aid" doctrine > In that case, the
defendant appealed the court 's denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained by an officer who entered his property, without a warrant, to seize
and aid an emaciated horse > The emergency aid doctrine provides: "[tlhat
officers may enter property without a warrant if they have an objectively
ld. at 157.
1d.
193 1d. at 132-33 ('[q]uickening'-the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing
usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy").
194 ld. 133-34.
19S ld . at 134.
1% ld. at 157 ('''Person' is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications
for Representatives and Senators .. . qualifications for the office of President . .. and the
superseded Fugitive Slave Clause").
197 See State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn . 622,998 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2010).
198 ld. at 661.
199 ld. at 701-02.
200 ld. at 664-65. (the born alive rule states that "the death of a fetus could stand as a basis for
murder as long as the fetus was born alive and subsequently died of injuries inflicted in utero.").
201 See State v. Fessenden , 310 P.3d 1163 (Or. Ct. App . 2014).
202 ld. at 1164.
191
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reasonable belief ... necessary to either render immediate aid to persons,
or to assist persons who have suffered, or who are imminently threatened
with suffering , serious physical injury or harm.' > The court's reasoning fell
on the reasonableness of setting the exception's boundaries to encompass
non-human animals." The court, after reviewing a number of animal
welfare and anti-cruelty statutes as well as legislative history and state
precedent , held that the exception does encompass non-human animals >
The court weighed the societal interest in protecting non-human animals
from suffering, trauma, and death and held that warrantless searches can be
justified if used to stop those harms from occurring ...
2. Non-Human Captivity, Servitude, Slavery and the Thirteenth
Amendment
The abhorrent institution of slavery in the United States was
explicitly condemned to history with the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment > The Thirteenth Amendment reads: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.'> The Supreme Court, in the SlaughterHouse Cases, gave early insight into the breadth in which the Thirteenth
Amendment can apply stating:
"In giving construction to any of those articles it is necessary to keep this
main purpose steadily in view, though the letter and spirit of those articles
must apply to all cases coming within their purview . . . . While the
thirteenth article of amendment was intended primarily to abolish African
slavery, it equally forbids allforms of involuntary slavery ofwhatever class
or name,':»

With this backdrop, Tilikum ex rei. PETA, Inc. v, Sea World Parks
& Entertainment, provided a modem test case on whether the Thirteenth
Amendment's applicability could extend to a non-human animals.'» PETA
brought a Next of Friend action on behalf of five orca whales,v seeking,
(emphasis added) .
at 1167-68.
20S [d. at 1169.
203 Id .
204 Id.

206 [d.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
Id
209 The Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. 36. 37 (1872) (emphasis added).
210 Tilikum ex rei. PETA. Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259
(S.D. Cal. 2012).
211 [d. at 1260 (Tilikurn , Katina, Corky, Kasatka and Ulises).
207 See
.
208
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among other things, a declaration that the orcas were being held by Sea
World in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment» In a brief opinion, the
court concluded that there is "no basis to construe the Thirteenth
Amendment as applying to non-humans .?« The court reasoned that
historical sources show that the terms "slavery" and "involuntary
servitude" referred only to persons » The definition of slave , however, was
not uniform when the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified > The Johnson's
Dictionary, published in 1836, defines 'slave' as "one reduced to captivity,
to servitude, or bondage who is bound or compelled to serve, labour, or toil
for, obey, another.'> "Slave" is defined as "one reduced to captivity, to
servitude, to bondage; who is bound or compelled to serve, labour, or toil
for, obey, another" in A New Dictionary of the English Language ,
published in 1838.'"
The court also referenced the "except as a punishment for crime"
phrase, in the Thirteenth Amendment, as further evidence since only
persons, and not non-human animals, are subject to criminal convictions.«
The court also rested its conclusion on relevant portions of the
Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln, which repeatedly
referred to "person" in the context of African slaves>
PETA then argued that the court should enlarge the Thirteenth
Amendment to encompass orcas since other constitutional principles, such
as the right to privacy, have evolved as times and circumstances have
changed > The court rejected this argument finding that the Thirteenth
Amendment was drafted with a very narrow and singular purpose-ending
slavery in the United States > With PETA unable to convince the court to
212

Id .

m Id. at 1264.
("In 1864, the term 'slavery' was defined as '[t]he condition ofa slave; the state of entire
subjection of one person to the will of another. ''') (quoting NOAHWEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF
THEENGLISH LANGUAGE 1241 (Merriam Co. 1864).
21S See Jeffrey S. Kerr, Martina Bernstein, Amanda Schwoerke, Matthew D. Strugar & Jared S.
Goodman, A Slav e by Any Other Name Is Still A Slave: The Tilikum Case and Application ofthe
Thirteenth Amendment to Nonhuman Animals, 19 ANIMAL L. 221 , 268 (20 13) (internal quotations
omitted) (internal citations omitted).
216 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).
217 [d. (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).
218 Tilikum , 842 F. Supp, 2d at 1263.
219 Id. (the court refers in relevant part : [A]I1persons held as slaves within any State or designated
part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebell ion against the United States, shall be
then, thenceforward, and forever free ; and the Executive Government of the United States,
including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of
such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them in any efforts they
may make for their actual freedom.").
214 Id.

220ld.
22!

Id. at 1264.
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apply the Thirteenth Amendment to the orca whales, the court held that it
lacked standing to bring the action,»

D. Corporations: The First Non-Human Legal Person and the Common
Law Expansion ofPersonhood Rights
1. Corporations: Nonhuman Creatures of Statute Empowered with
Substantive Rights as a Person under Common Law
"[I]t is sufficient to say that American authorities are in one accord
in holding that the word "person" is a generic term of comprehensive
nature, embracing natural and artificial persons, such as corporations."> For
almost two centuries the United States has recognized corporations as more
than just a business entity but also as a "being" with abilities that are coextensive with a natural person's ability > The legal recognition in the eyes
of the law permits it to initiate and defend causes of actions,» Corporations
have even been found to be a person capable of being a victim, in the
criminal law context, in its own distinct right such that a defendant may be
convicted of identity theft> These instances, however anecdotal, are
significant because like non-human animals , corporations are not human
beings. Despite this fact, the courts, almost invariably, recognize
corporations as legal persons. Therefore , the recognition of personhood
under our laws is not innately biological.
Corporations are universally recognized as creatures of statute >
The twentieth century gave rise to the general acceptance of the entity
theory, which views corporations as real person > Today, corporations are
considered "artificial creations of human beings and the law.''- Statutory
laws on corporations, however, do have their limitations and the courts

222 [d.

State ex rei. Nw . Colonization & Imp. Co. of Chihuahua v , Huller, 168 P. 528, 530 (N.M.
1917)
224 Trustees ofDanrnouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) .
22S Jones v. Martz & Meek Construction Co., 107 N.W.2d 802, 803 (Mich . 1961).
226 See State v. Evans, 298 P.3d 724 (Wash. 2013) ("[AJ victim of identity theft must be another
~erson, living or dead. and corporations can qualify . ..."),
7 See In re Involuntary Dissolution of Wiles Bros ., Inc., 830 N.W.2d 474,480 (Neb. 2013) ("We
have also stated that corporations are creatures of statute, and they may be dissolved only
according to statute."); Airvator, Inc. v, Turtle Mountain Manufacturing Co., 329 N.W.2d 596,
602 (N.D. 1983) ("A corporation is not in fact or in reality a person, but is created by statute and
the law treats it as though it were a person by the process of fiction, or by regarding it as an
artificial person distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.")
228 Susanna Kim Ripken , Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 112 (2009).
229 [d. at 106.
22l
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have stepped in to vindicate the constitutional rights of corporations > In
essence, the law gives corporations life, but it is the court that has been
responsible for giving substantive rights . '"

2. Corporations Have Substantive Rights as Persons Under Common
Law Precedent
One of the earliest cases highlighting the courts role in corporate
personhood and substantive rights is Santa Clara County. v. Southern
Pacific Rail Road» In that case, Chief Justice Morris Waite announced:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids
a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws , applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does, »
The U.S . Supreme Court has subsequently extended the Due Process clause
to corporations and has held that their property cannot be taken without just
compensation»
Although the Court had previously mentioned the rights of
corporations in passing or rather obliquely, the court took the most direct
approach in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti » In that case , the
Court struck down parts of a criminal statute that prevented corporations
from making contributions "for the purpose of . .. influencing or affecting
the vote on any question submitted to the voter, other than one materially
affecting the property ... of the corporation.?- The Court, after delving
into the past precedence set by the Court, found that there was no tenable
legal reason why corporations should not be protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendment>

230 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S . 310,365 (2010) ("[T]he Government may not suppress
golitical speech on the basis ofthe speaker's corporate identity.").
31 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,365 (2010) (right to engage in political speech);
Trustees of Dartmouth ColI. v. Woodward, 17 U.S . 518, 636, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819) (right to
contract) .
232 118 U.S. 394 (1886) .

233 ld.

See Cotting v. Godard , 183 U.S. 79 (1901) .
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U.S. 765 (1978) .
236 [d. at 768.
217 [d. at 784. ("We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions
of this Court , for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the
First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation . . ..").
234
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PROPOSAL TO ADVANCE THE PROTECTION OF CHIMPANZEES

A.
Limited Common Law Personhood Status for Chimpanzee Standing
for Inhumane Conditions and Abuse
Irrespective of where courts apply limited personhood status for
chimpanzees, it must first address the threshold issue of whether
chimpanzees are legal persons under common law. The first section will
propose that common law should recognize chimpanzees as legal persons,
in limited legal circumstances, in light of social, moral, and scientific
advancements today. Once the question of personhood is answered in the
affirmative, the next section will propose limited personhood status under
habeas corpus. The section will address how habeas corpus can be
effectively applied to chimpanzees seeking transfer to a sanctuary instead
of an outright release to the wild. The following section will propose
limited personhood recognition for standing under the ESA and the effects
of such an extension. The final section proposes that common law
personhood recognition should not be rejected because of fear that it will
be the gateway for all nonhuman animals or that it will cause a burden on
the court.
1.

Common Law Extension of Limited Legal Personhood Status for
Chimpanzees

American public OpInIOn is shifting more favorably toward
chimpanzees. More than ten years ago, public polls indicated that a
significant majority of Americans-eight-five percent-believe that
chimpanzees have complex, social, intellectual, and emotional lives> In
the same poll, a simple majority of Americans believed that chimpanzees
should be "treated similar to children, with guardians to look after their
interest."> Recently, Congress passed legislation to amend the Chimpanzee
Health Improvement, Maintenance and Protection (CHIMP) Act, which
now gives the National Institutes of Health (NIH) the funding it needs to
move nearly all of the 360 government-owned chimpanzees to
sanctuaries .... Support for animal rights in general has seen an upswing in
2J8 Wise,
239
.

supra note 129, at 239.
Id
240 Samantha Miller, Bipartisan Chimpanzee Retirement Legislation Passes Senate, Goes to
President Obamafor Signature, THE HUMANE SOCIETY, (Nov. 20, 2015, II :45 PM),
http ://www.humancsocicty.orglnews/prcssJclcases/20 13/II /rechimp-lcgislation-passes-senate111413 .html.

AN ESTAL

Pall 2017

CHIMPANZEES IN COURT

103

public opinion . This year, almost one-third of surveyed Americans believed
animals should have rights equal to those of humans > While this paper
does not go as far as to suggest that proposition, and is narrowly focused on
chimpanzees, the poll does serve as more evidence that American society is
changing and our current legal positions on chimpanzees and other nonhuman animals are "unsuited" to the modern experience and no longer
adequately serving the "interests of justice.'>
Chimpanzees, like humans , have the capacity to suffer and an
interest in not suffering» Under the principle of equal considerations- their
natural desire to be autonomous and free should be given equal
consideration unless there are compelling reasons not to give their desires
equal consideration> Compelling reasons usually come in the form of a
competing human interest> With the last of our society's most compelling
human interest-animal testing on chimpanzees-close to extinction, the
traditional justifications asserted for denying their interests equal
consideration, are becoming more suspect. Rights are "moral notions that
grow out of respect for the individual. ".., Chimpanzees, both scientifically
and socially, are highly regarded animals because of their nearly human
genetic makeup and intelligence . Therefore, chimpanzees should be
entitled to some legal personhood protection despite the small price that
would be "paid by the general welfare."... The price of legal personhood
will be the rejection of the last few purported human interests left that wish
to keep chimpanzees captive and unreasonably restrained. The price must
be paid because America's modern moral conscious, in regard to
chimpanzees , dictates no less. The remaining exploitative industries ,
namely circuses, chimpanzees, must bear this cost.
The aforementioned social, moral, and scientific- developments
"are strengthening the argument for chimpanzee legal personhood."> In
light of these dramatic changes, courts should not be obligated to adhere to

241 Tanya Lewis, Rights/or Animals, LIYESCIENCE, (Nov. 5,2015,5:45 PM).
http://www.1ivescience.com/50889-animal-rights-poll.html. (polled by Gallup) .
242 Tincher v. Omega Flex. Inc .• 104 A.3d 328 , 352 (Pa. 2014).
243 Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and Personhood. in PEOPLE, PROPERTY, OR PETS?
77,84 (Marc D. Hauser, Piery Cushman & Matthew Kamen eds. 2006) . ("the rule that we ought to
treat like cases alike unless there is a good reason not to do so").
244

u.

245

Id.

246 Id.
247 I d.
248

at 78 (some human interest include scientific experimentation and agricultural practice) .

Id.

supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scientific developments
concerning the biological and cognitive abilit ies of chimpanzees.
250 Wise, supra note 129, at 239 .
249 See
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the "frozen mold of ancient ideas." .., Courts must be empowered to utilize
the "active and dynamic" power of common law to comport "with the
times and growth of society [in order] to meet its need.?«
2.

Limited Personhood Status for Habeas Corpus Relief

A chimpanzee's ability to seek habeas corpus relief from
unreasonable confinement will also be simplified significantly. A technical,
but crucial, concern highlighted in Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rei.
Kiko v, Presti was whether habeas corpus review was proper when the
petitioner, in that case Kiko, sought to not be released, but transferred to a
sanctuary » Petitioners, however, have routinely used habeas corpus review
to obtain transfers to a better quality and less restrictive facility, especially
in the context of mental health- and juvenile delinquency cases> The
diametrical differences between the housing conditions found in zoos and
circuses compared to that found in sanctuaries are readily apparent. Captive
entertainment chimpanzees are well documented as victims of abuse and
unsafe conditions > Experts have documented cases in which they have
concluded that the examined chimpanzees showing signs of psychological
distress including complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD).'" Even
if they no longer have to perform, their subsequent transfer to private
owners usually results in worse solitary conditions as evidenced by the
penurious living conditions of Tommy the chimpanzee in Lavery» The
mental and physical health of zoo chimpanzees fare no better and often
show a variety of serious behavioral abnormalities,» Social deprivation and

In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., Inc., 510 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ind. 1987).
Id .
253 Presti, 124 A.D.3d at 1335.
254 See generally Mental Hygiene Legal Services ex rei. Cruz v. Wack, 551 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y.
1989) (holding that mental health patient in "secure" facility was to entitled to transfer to a "nonsecure" facility by way of writ habeas corpus relief) ; McGraw v. Wack, 220 A.D.2d 291, 293
(N.Y. App . Div. 1995) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus was the proper vehicle for petitioner
to seek a transfer to a non-secure facility); People ex rei. Schreiner v. Tekben, 611 N.Y.S.2d 734,
736 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that the psychiatric detainee's writ of babe as corpus is the
afspropriate mechanism for transfer from a secure to non-secure facility) .
25 See generally State ex reI. B. S. v. Hill, 294 S.E.2d 126, 127 (W. Va. I982)(granting habeas
review and bolding that the detention facility was non-secure despite incarcerated juvenile
habeas challenge alleging the facility was in fact secure) .
256 Alicia Graef, Behind the Scenes Suffering a/Circus Chimpanzees Exposed, CARE2 (Nov. 5,
20 IS, 5:45 PM), http://www.care2.comlcauseslbehind-the-scenes-suffering-of-circuschimpanzees-exposed.htrnl.
257Id.
258 Mountain, supra note 167.
259 Lucy P. Birkett & Nicholas E. Newton-Fisher, How Abnormal Is the Behaviour a/Captive,
Zoo-Living Chimpanzees? I (plos One),
251
252
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maternal separation have been suggested as causal factors > In one study,
forty chimpanzees, living in six accredited zoological institutions, were
observed extensively by experts attempting to see whether they displayed
abnormal behavior> The results found that all forty chimpanzees showed
some abnormal behavior> Zoo-housed chimpanzees have also been found
to have a higher propensity for heart disease > Sanctuaries on the other
hand, provide some of the most pristine environments for chimpanzees
from all backgrounds .... The Save The Chimps sanctuary, the world's
largest chimpanzee sanctuary located in South Florida, has a sprawling 150
acre property with 12 separate three-acre islands> The sanctuary has over
250 chimpanzees that are free to live in large family groups and roam free
as their psychological well-being demands .... Many sanctuaries throughout
the United States have similar positive and healthy environments for all
chimpanzees .'''
With this information, courts would have very little issue regarding
sanctuary transfers by writ of habeas corpus. Most of the U.S. owned
research chimpanzees are in the process of being transferred to
sanctuaries > Like the restrictive and harsh conditions found in secure
facilities for the juvenile delinquents and criminals with severe mental
illness, zoo and circus confinements are highly detrimental to the physical
and mental health of chimpanzees. Courts should find that the basis for
chimpanzees' seeking a transfer from either a zoo or a circus to a sanctuary
by writ of habeas corpus is well founded in analogous situations with
human beings, and proper.

http ://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doill 0.13 711joumal.pone.002010 I &r
epresentation=PDF

2&OId.
Id. at 2.
262
Id.
261

Victoria Gill, Why do Zoo Apes Get Heart Disease?, B.B .C. (Nov. 5,2015,5:20 PM),
http: //www.bbc.co.uklnature/17542031 .
2M Jennifer Feuerstein, Rare Access Inside the World's Biggest Chimpanzee Sanctuary,
TAKEPART(Nov. 5,2015,5:45 PM), http://www.takepart.com!articleI2013/07/09/chirnpanzeesanctuary-save-the-chimps-introduction.
265 History, SAVETHECHIMPS (Nov. 5, 2015 , 5:58 PM), http://www.savethechimps.org/thech imps-history/.
266 SAVETHE CHIMPS(last visited Nov. 5,20 IS, 5:58 PM), httpv/www.savethechimps.org/thechimps-history/.
267 See CENTERFORGREATAPES, http://www.centerforgrcatapes.org/(Iastvisited Nov . 5, 2015 ,
5:57 PM); CHIMPANZEE SANCTUARY NW , http://www.chimpsanctuarynw.org/ (last visited Nov .
5,2015,5 :58 PM); CHIMPHAVEN, http: //www.chimphaven.org/(IastvisitedNov. 5, 2015, 5:59
PM).
268 Darryl Fears, NIH Ends Era of u.s. Medical Research on Chimpanzees, THE WASHINGTON
POST(Nov. 20, 2015 , 6 :45 PM), https ://www.washingtonpost.comlnews/speaking-ofscience/wp/20 15/II /IS/nih -ends-the-era-of-us-medical-research-on-chimpanzees/.
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3. Limited Personhood Status for Standing Under the ESA to Allow
Action for Release to Sanctuary
The first and most notable practical consequence of granting
limited personhood to chimpanzees is the effect it would have on Article III
standing. As Professor Stacy Gordon observed when contemplating this
potential development, "Although standing would not be automatic, legal
personhood would entirely change the analysis for some animals.t'-As the
legal "person" bringing suit, the question would center on whether the
chimpanzee's injury is "concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical'> If the chimpanzee can show this, then "the
most problematic" element in standing will no longer be so» Causation
will also be much easier to satisfy since the court would now trace the
defendant's actions back to the chimpanzee's injury and not to the
attenuated aesthetic injury suffered by a Next of Friend plaintiff. Finally,
when determining redressability under an ESA action, it will be more
"likely , as opposed to merely speculative.'> that the chimpanzee will be
redressed with a favorable decision, even if the relief only "take[s] steps to
slow or reduce the injury .'"
As a plaintiff satisfying Article III , chimpanzees will clear the
"undemanding test" of prudential standing> Chimpanzees, as legal persons
and the direct beneficiaries of the ESA , will fall directly within the "zone
of interest protected by the statute.'> The procedural requirement of
standing would thus no longer be as challenging and a chimpanzee could
"wing its way into court as a plaintiff in its own right' > to address alleged
violations of his substantive rights under the law.
The representation of chimpanzees, for all practical purposes,
should mirror the guardian ad litem system used to assist children in
defending or prosecuting lawsuits. Like children, a chimpanzee cannot
initiate or defend lawsuits without adult representation» Judges presiding
over chimpanzee cases would have the inherent power of appointing
guardians ad litem. They would in tum have the duty to ensure that the
chimpanzee's interest is sufficiently represented in court. An issue more
Gordon, supra note 54, at 239.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 .
271 Gordon , supra note 54 , at 214 .
212 Defenders afWildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.
273 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 ,525 (2007).
274 Gordon, supra note 54, at 222.
275 [d.
276 Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir , 1988).
277 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 870 (rev . 2d ed. 2005).
269
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problematic than legal matters regarding children, however, is obvious
communications barriers that would prevent guardians from asserting the
actual desires of the chimpanzee. The central role of a guardian, in the
context of chimpanzee representation, would be strikingly similar in the
sense that guardians would not serve as an attorney for the chimpanzee but
an officer appointed to protect the chimpanzee's interest in not being
abused or held in inhumane conditions > Following that, the scope of the
guardian's duty would be limited to the matters in determining the state and
condition of the chimpanzee, to investigate the facts of his or her welfare,
and to report these facts to the appointing court along with recommendation
based on the facts>
With limited personhood status, comes limited legal relief under
the law. Thus , the remedies available for chimps should be limited to
injunctive relief. More specifically, the only remedy that would be
available for chimpanzee's who are kept inhumanely or abused by their
holders would be release and transfer to a sanctuary by injunctive relief.
Injunctive relief is an equitable specific remedy designed to avoid future
harm> It is available only when there is a showing that a legal remedy
would be inadequate> One of the equitable criteria for granting an
injunction is showing irreparable harm to the plaintiff» This remedy is
extraordinary in nature,« and thus requires that the guardian ad litem for the
chimpanzee makes the strongest case possible to warrant the court to
relinquish the chimpanzee from his or her legal holders and to the save care
of an approved sanctuary.

278

/d . at 873 .

279

Id.

E. Schaffner, Remedies ill Animal-Related Litigation, ill 437 LITIGATING A..'IIMAI LAW
DISPUTERS A COMPLETE GUIDE FORLAWYERS (loan E. Schaffner & Julie Fershtman eds . 2009 ).
2Sl
ld .
m Id. See generally Lue v. Eady, 773 S.E.2d 679, 687 (Ga . 2015) ("Courts of equity will not
exercise [the power of injunctive relief] to allay mere apprehensions of injury, but only where the
injury is imminent and irreparable and there is no adequate remedy at law.") (alteration in
original).
280 loan

283 See generally Lee v, Konrad, 337 P.3d 510, 517 (Alaska 2014) ("Equitable injunctive relief is
an extraordinary remedy that is appropriate only where the party requesting relief is likely to
otherwise suffer irreparable injury and lacks an adequate remedy at law.")
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B. Is The Camel's Nose in Pandora's Box?: Limited Personhood
Expansion Will Not Create Abuse in the Legal System
Expansion of rights for the underrepresented will always be met
with the classic slippery slope argument. The question will be: if
chimpanzees are giving legal personhood, what animal will be next? "The
camel's nose is in the tent" argument, which was argued passionately by
Justice Stewart in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission» says
that an act, however harmless when taken on its own, could potentially
open the door to similar actions that will be increasingly pernicious >
Chimpanzees are in a unique category in the world of non-human
animals . They are prime candidates for a common law extension of limited
personhood status because their "human-like" qualities put them in a
category that makes them the worthiest. Namely, chimpanzees are selfconscious, have elements of the theory of mind, they can understand
symbols, and have the capacity for using complex communication
systems .... These traits are bona fide distinctions that should allow
chimpanzees to be rights-holders. Unlike chimpanzees, who can satisfy this
very exclusive requirement, other life forms, like amoebas or echinoderms,
cannot possibly be eligible for such a bestowment because they are nonsentient animals with no centralized nervous system > Bodily autonomy
and complex cognitive ability should be a necessary condition for rights.
The ability to be self-aware and a sentient being, cuts to the heart of liberty
in the sense that chimpanzees can understand and appreciate their quality of
life and understand when they are being confined. As science and our
understanding of other animals advance, the possibility of some limited
right must be readdressed in the future. For now, chimpanzees are part of a
very small percentage of candidates worthy of a limited common law grant
of personhood.
The slippery slope argument forces decision makers to concentrate
on the possible, however dubious the claim, future consequences of how
they rule today > Consequentialist fears that stoked suspicions in striking
down the invidious practice of school segregation,» and granting equal
protection for women,» while also providing decision makers with ample

284 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 , 402 (1973)
(Stewart, 1., dissenting).
285 Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv . 361 , 362 (1985).
286 The Evolving Legal Status ofChimpanzees, 9 fu'lIMAL L. I, 29 (2003).
287 What Beings Are Not Conscious, ANIMAL ETHICS (Nov . 13,2015,5:20 PM) ,
http: //www.animaI-ethics.org/beings-conscious/.
288 Schauer, supra note 284 , at 382.
289 Brown v. Board. of Education, Kansas, 349 U.S. 483 (1955).
290 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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justification to perpetuate the abhorrent practice of criminalizing
homosexuality z- has no basis or place in law. The fear of potential abuse
and degradation of our legal system by utilizing the power of the courts for
chimpanzees can never be a legally sufficient reason to deny an opportunity
to rectify the injustice or the vindications of rights they sustain . As the New
York Court of Appeals stated in rejecting this species of argumentation :
fflloodgates oflitigation's alarum seems singularly unpersuasive in view of
our Court's repeated admonitions that it is not a ground for denying a
cause of action that there will be a proliferation of claims and if a
cognizable wrong has been committed that there must be a remedy,
whatever the burden ofthe courts»
CONCLUSION

The power and scope of common law empower the courts to
evolve and to make just decisions. The person-or-property legal dichotomy
that currently plagues chimpanzees can no longer stand in light of the
social, moral, and scientific developments made in American society today.
A limited grant would give chimpanzees the ability to vindicate their own
rights in court when physically injured or inhumanely confined by their
legal holders. Common law has the power to modify and abandon
principles when our courts conclude that the principle no longer comport to
societies norms or to avoid injustice .
The current legal structure of Article III standing for nonhuman
animals make legal action on behalf of chimpanzees very difficult. With
the question of injury being based on the harm suffered by humans, this
element will prevent many colorable third-party lawsuits from ever
reaching on the merits of the case. Even when standing requirements have
been met, judicially created prudential considerations serve as an additional
barrier to lawsuits on behalf of harmed chimpanzees. The Somerset Case
demonstrates that brave, bold, and just decisions by a single judge could
fundamentally change the course of a court and a society. Past approaches,
through the Thirteenth Amendment or writ of habeas corpus, can provide
protection and relief to non-human animals if the court is willing to
exercise its common law power to correct injustices. Corporations serve as
an important reminder that a "legal person" is not synonymous with
"human-being."
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
292 Enright by Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 207 (N. y. 1991) (alteration in original)
(internal quotations omitted).
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The proposals outlined would allow chimpanzees to exercise their
positive right to seek protection under the law. A common law extension of
habeas corpus relief for chimpanzees would be a critical first step in giving
the court the ability to ensure that their living conditions are humane and
that they are treated humanely. Current law permits habeas review to obtain
transfers to better quality and less restrictive facilities in other legal
contexts and would be just as effective for chimpanzees seeking a transfer
to a sanctuary. Many sanctuaries throughout the United States allow
chimpanzees to live and socialize freely as their psychological well-being
demands. Sanctuaries create a positive, safe, and healthy environment for
all of their chimpanzee residents. Limited personhood status under the ESA
would give chimpanzees the ability to vindicate their rights with competent
representation akin to a guardian ad litem. This ability would be limited in
scope with respect to remedies to permit only release to a sanctuary.
Unsubstantiated fears of potential abuse of our legal system can never be a
legally sufficient reason to deny an opportunity for chimpanzees to seek
redress for legitimate claims of abuse.

